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Abstract—The rapid development of various emerging tech-
nologies such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT)
presents significant security and privacy challenges. In particular,
complex and challenging applications involving various business
parties have the requirement to delegate access control mecha-
nisms securely to one or more parties, who in turn can govern
methods that enable multiple other parties to be authenticated
in relation to the services that they wish to consume. Moreover,
modern integrated design and manufacturing follows a business
model where different third-party vendors provide hardware,
software, and manufacturing services, making it hard to ensure
the trustworthiness of the entire process. The emergence of IoT
has led to our use of Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
devices with Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) abilities,
which allows for modifications to the hardware implemented to
undergo changes and incorporate dynamic addition/deletion of
access using security protocols. We use, Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUF), cryptographic hardware primitive which are
based on a physical system having easy to evaluate, hard to
predict and manufacturer resistant properties in developing a
security protocol. In this paper, we combine the concepts of
hardware security through PUFs and hardware evolution through
DPR in providing dynamic secure multiparty authentication
system.
Keywords— cryptographic protocol, dynamic partial reconfigura-
tion, physically unclonable functions, cloud computing, analytics,
security, multiparty interactions, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to uniquely identifiable de-
vices/objects connected to the internet that can sense data and react
with their environment [1], [2]. Computing is focused on the vast
amount of data collected and made accessible by connecting all
smart objects within an IoT system [3]. IoT ‘things’ are dynamic
in nature requiring flexible software and hardware [4]. Software
applications are well known for their flexibility, but plasticity in
hardware is an emerging field. The concept of flexible hardware was
introduced with the advent of new technologies such as Dynamic
Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) in re-programmable hardware such as
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices [5]. DPR enables
the use of fewer or smaller devices, reducing power consumption
and enhancing system upgrades. These features led to the growing
demand for deployment of FPGAs in areas including IoT [6]. As
software provides a very high amount of flexibility, which is lacking
in hardware, FPGAs are thought to bridge this gap. However, the de-
sign of these systems can be challenging, and this is particularly true
of the configuration controller. Currently, new tools have been widely
developed to support and promote DPR capabilities in FPGAs [7].
Another highly demanding requirement for IoT is security [6],
[8]. Nowadays cryptography has become part of our everyday lives
due to the security requirement of more common activities including
communication, encryption disks, and electronic money systems.
Currently, hardware security, where programmable logic solutions can
provide additional security in the form of cryptographic hardware
solutions (CHS) are widely in research [9], [10]. Currently, most
industrial sectors use hardware security modules (HSMs) to provide
dedicated cryptographic services to ensure ultimate device protection
with a dual focus on high performance and security [11]. Hardened
authentications are highly resistant to remote attacks and are capa-
ble to meet any level of endpoint security and are high potential
candidates for the future business. CHS in the form of Physically
Unclonable Function (PUF) technology is world leaders in security
IP cores [12]. Currently, IoT employs reconfigurable and lightweight
devices with embedded security for a variety of applications [13],
[14].
In a distributed system architecture such as cloud [15], the user
becomes dynamic or system may need to upgrade their product
to stay updated. As FPGAs are designed to provide the necessary
flexibility due to the infield reconfigurable device features within
limited time, they provide benefits to enterprises [16]–[18]. FP-
GAs are also increasingly used in embedded security applications
as they provide flexibility including algorithm agility, architecture
efficiency, resource efficiency, algorithm modification, throughput and
cost efficiency [19]. All protection mechanisms in hardware-enforced
using cryptographic techniques and dynamism using reconfiguration
provide a compact solution for flexibility and security. It is also
known that the use of programmable hardware in system imple-
mentation can improve performance. Although the relatively higher
power dissipation of FPGAs in previous generations was a challenge
to limit their deployment in power sensitive applications, Ultra low
power FPGAs are now widely available for IoT usage. For distributed
systems and IoT applications, DPR-enabled FPGAs are the platform
of choice [6]. Furthermore, It may be subject to malicious circuit
alterations, usually referred to as Hardware Trojan insertion [20],
[21]. Such attacks use the same DPR capabilities that are otherwise
so valuable. Therefore, proper defense strategies must be put in place
to counter such threats while taking into account the inherent physical
restraints of IoT. With the growing popularity of services delivered by
cloud computing, it is important that both cloud providers and cloud
users have confidence that there are appropriate safeguards in place to
ensure an acceptable level of security and privacy mechanisms [22]–
[24]. A number of researchers have contributed to strengthen security
and privacy protection in cloud applications, and there are various
cryptographic algorithms to address potential security and privacy
problems in cloud [25]–[28]. It follows that research topics related
to cloud security have attracted tremendous research interest [29]–
[32].
The remaining part of the paper is organised as following. In
section II, we discuss the multiparty delivery system emphasis-
ing security. Section III, describes the challenges associated with
the design of multiparty system. Various multiparty authentication
methods are provided in Section IV. In section V we describe the
hardware security primitive used in this work. The proposed protocol
for multiparty authentication is described in Section VI. Finally,
we conclude the work with directions for future development in
Section VIII.
II. MULTIPARTY SERVICE DELIVERY AND SECURITY
As enterprises are being more conscious of data collection, anal-
ysis, modelling, and prediction, the need for systems with a faithful
representation of business processes is becoming widespread. This
means that the underlying digital services must demonstrate both
robustness and flexibility to tolerate new and unanticipated business
scenarios. As such, process flows may be difficult to predict in
some instances, especially if a business offers bespoke services or
products to customers, where a transaction may execute only once
[33]. As a consequence of this, the eventual application that is
delivered is underpinned by a collection of disparate services that are
orchestrated at run-time, that may have origins in organisations that
are heterogeneous. Each of the host organisations will have adopted
security measures that are unique to the enterprise, with the effect
that an application composed of multiple services will thus present
a number of different security realms. Each realm typically consists
of data that represents a collection of resource principals, that are
registered with a trusted principal such as a certificate authority. The
principals are governed by a set of security policies that control access
to other services and resources within the scope of the application
[34]. The certificate authority is deemed to be trustworthy across
the application domain and is present to validate users and functions
[35]. It is essential that each security realm is authenticated against
to ensure that a principal has the appropriate security privileges to
consume services marshalled by a security realm. The identity of a
principal needs to be confirmed by the correct authentication process
of the relevant realm so as to correctly identify and establish who the
principal is. During the authentication process, security credentials
that were given to the principal by the relevant security realm are
used to authenticate it.
In the case of more complex application architectures, such
as cloud-based services provision, each cloud may hide multiple
instances of other clouds and/or services [36]. It follows that not
only will there be numerous authentication mechanisms to keep
maintained, but they will have to be invoked dynamically at run-
time on demand. If separate authentication processes are established
across disparate security realms, there is a potential for a significant
increase in authentication workload and the consequential side-effects
on network bandwidth and computational cycles [37]. The scenario
where a multiparty session is composed of many two-party sessions
is explored by in [38], which demonstrates that there is a need for
a protocol for multiparty session authentication. There is an inherent
challenge here that it is not always possible for a session participant
to establish whether another session participant is actually a member
of the multiparty session in progress.
III. KEY CHALLENGES FOR MULTIPARTY ENVIRONMENTS
The wider distribution of of IoT nodes and the extent and nature
of the data collected and transformed by IoT devices are a major
challenge for security. The wider distribution of of IoT nodes and the
extent and nature of the data collected and transformed by IoT devices
are a major challenge for security. In the IoT domain, authentication
permits the integration of various IoT devices deployed in various
contexts. In view of the fact that services and organisations can adopt
a collaborative process in an extremely vibrant and flexible manner,
direct cross-realm authentication relationship is not simply a means
of joining the two collaborating realms. The lack of authentication
path connecting two security realms will necessitate two security
realms, when working together, to follow a more traditional and
long route that will involve creating a mutual trust entailing entering
into contractual agreements, multi-round cooperation and human
intervention.
The primary reason for this lack of progress is due to serious
concerns about the security, privacy, and reliability of these systems.
IoT is capable of monitoring all aspect of day-to-to life, including
the above-mentioned concerns [39], [40]. Citizens, therefore, have
legitimate concerns about privacy. In addition, businesses are con-
cerned with damage to their reputations due to data being handled by
wrong hands, and the governments fear the consequences of security
risks [41]. Multiparty authentication is a complex challenge in a
multi-cloud environment. These challenges increase in complexity
when we consider the potential proliferation of devices in IoT
systems. In general, such systems may be a one-to-one mapping
between system access devices and the clouds themselves.
However, there are also several additional complications of numer-
ous devices with varying degrees of functionality and capability. An
example of such a device is a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), which
are often adaptive entities that may be applicable to the addition or
removal of sensor nodes during operation.
Various reports predict a remarkable increase in the number of
connected intelligent ‘things’ exceeding 20 billion by 2020 [42].
As we see the exponential growth of the connected devices, the
predictions seem to be believable. If these predictions come true, then
the demand for authentication of devices will be a major challenge to
address, especially as there will be insufficient capacity to manually
authenticate even a fraction of the devices and consequently, some
automation will be mandatory.
A fundamental challenge in a complex environment like the IoT or
multi-clouds is the necessity to manage and ensure communications
that enable the required authentication approvals [43].
The use of Single Sign On (SSO) also allows the use of a key ex-
change technique to actually manage the provision of authentication
credentials certified by a named authority. In addition, it eliminates
the need for users to enter different security credentials multiple times
[44], [45].
However, despite the relative simplicity of the technique, it simply
provides a secure method of key exchange is insufficient for the
situation when we need multiple parties to be capable to establish
certain trust each other in a dynamic, heterogeneous environment,
and therefore SSO technique is lacking in this regard.
IV. AUTHENTICATING MULTIPLE PARTIES
With the explosive growth of Internet of Things applications the
transition of traditional communication services to the Internet is
becoming increasingly important for group communication. Several
new online services and applications are emerging, such as Cloud
computing which enables users to elastically scale their applications,
software platforms and hardware infrastructures. These cloud imple-
mentations increase the sharing of resources by separating solutions
into different tiers [46].
In contrast, where cloud computing systems share a domain,
services for the delivery of data analytics are more prone to external
threats such as: distributed attacks, malware attacks, and other known
security and privacy issues for cloud computing [47], which are
applicable to distributed systems also. Consequently, the growing
proliferation of services offered by IoT technologies poses many risks
related with security and privacy as well.
A. Dynamic authentication
In a multi-tenancy environment, Cloud-based business systems are
dynamic and involve similarly dynamic authentication interactions.
Hence, the authentication frameworks cannot be static. Burrows [48]
proposed a tenant privacy framework using a global authentication
register as an attempt to facilitate dynamic authentication.
Dynamic authentication creates a per-session authenticator using
cryptography. With each authentication session between the requester
and the verifier, a dynamic authenticator changes.
In order to obtain the registration application certificate, the
register holds a private key and personal data for each tenant, and
subsequently provides the requisite private key, providing that the
personal data received by the system registrar is correct. Chen [49]
posits that a multi-tenant database hosted on a cloud platform can
serve the purpose of registering global authentication requests and
transactions, to include the specific details of which stakeholder has
initiated which transaction.
Each tenant is represented within the cloud service provider by
way of a record of specific data, that is appended to existing tenant
metadata.
It is the augmentation of this tenant data that enables the verifi-
cation of private data that has been supplied previously, a scheme
that was introduced by Pippa [50] and is described as identity-based
cryptography. This approach ensures that tenants within a multi-
tenant environment can only be granted access to the workspace that
they have been allocated.
The root key (common for the entire cloud) is the public key that
unlocks a cloud or grid-based workspace assigned to all valid cloud
tenants.
Interaction between the client and server enables data regarding the
client’s identity to be exchanged for the purposes of verification. As
part of this exchange, the public (root) key is included and added to
the private key that was generated as a by-product of the interaction.
The authentication registry server uses the signature to add private
key fields to the root key, for them to be sent to the client who
has made the rquest. Furthermore, other server arrays, which are
most likely to be clouds, can be allocated to undertake privacy-as-
a-service duties. These duties include the ability to provide identity-
based cryptography and identity-based signature generation for cloud
computing [50]. Such clouds arrange the key structures as hierarchies
as per Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Hierarchical key structures in cloud computing [34].
Each key is composed of two sub-components. The first is a public
key that is common across all authorised tenants of a cloud. The
second component is a private key that is used by the tenants of a
cloud sub-domain. This private key is generated as a by-product of
a tenant’s individual digital signature via a distinct cloud array.
B. Cloud sub-domains
Sub-domains within clouds are collections of virtual workspaces
that are private to a set of tenants or a business organisation. Users
who are not authorised are prevented from entering the workspaces
by the use of public keys [51].
The granting of a public key is marshalled by a requirement to
refer to personal records, such as employee data for instance. This is
augmented by additional security from a private key that is issued to
tenants, again using an suthorisation mechanism that depends upon
the provision of information that is personal and can uniquely identify
and distinguish a particular tenant.
It is the organisation that owns the private data (employee data in
this example), that administers and hosts the private key component
of the overall access key. The remaining component is the key to the
sub-domain that is generated and managed by the cloud provider. This
establishes a hierarchical organisation of the various key components,
as illustrated in Figure 2, where a commonplace use case of a staff
member needing to access operations data from a remote cloud.
C. Federation across clouds
As the number of parties requiring authorised access increases, so
does the complexity of the interactions that need to be managed via
the home cloud. Agent-based federation of services across multiple
clouds [52] is one solution to the challenge, which simplifies the
complexity by defining roles to manage service discovery, brokering
and authentication.
Service discovery agents constantly scan the cloud ‘horizon’ to
detect the presence of new services that can be utilised by tenants.
Within the set of available services, there is then a matching service
that attempts to identify service availability and correlate this with
service need. Finally, an agent that manages an authentication service
can then start the process of establishing trust between parties, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Hierarchical multi-party structure in multi-cloud computing [34].
Trust is established between the home and foreign clouds by the
use of several keys, whose creation is invoked as a trigger for the
relationship to be generated. Once this is in place, the home cloud
can then marshall services, via the authentication cloud, to whichever
collection of multiple parties that exists.
For a user to obtain trusted access to a resource, there now exists a
process where they divulge private information for authentication, in
order to create private keys as necessary. This identification, together
with the group key, is then added to the key for the home cloud.
It is essential that secure information is exchanged in order
to establish trust, but also to ensure that any redundancy and/or
resilience is built into the scheme [52]. It might be that the home
cloud could use attributes of tenants as a means of communicating
an intention to create trust with foreign clouds, on the basis that
the recipients themselves would manage and issue public keys, for
later augmentation with personalised private keys as per the scheme
described above.
In the IoT domain, the security controls that we are exploring
will be impractical to manage manually. Automation is an essential
enabler of a practical approach to trust between multiple parties [53],
and the ability to rely on the operation of such services is of
paramount importance to all parties.
The inherent complexity of combining services from multiple par-
ties in an open world setting will inevitably lead to the identification
of system errors, either before or after an effect is detected [53], [54].
These potential design flaws are compounded by the introduction
of human behaviour and operation of the business systems, as such
behaviours can be challenging to forecast accurately.
D. A multiparty authentication model
Prior work [34] describes a framework that addresses the chal-
lenges of providing the necessary agility for authorisation in a
dynamic, multi-party setting. Figure 3 illustrates the framework in the
context of a Session Authority Cloud that in this case is implemented
as a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), though it could also
be a remote cloud. The role of the SAC is to marshall the individual
sessions that are requested by any of the multiple parties (clouds).
The SAC does not distinguish between clouds, nor does it rely
on them being classified as ‘home’ or ‘foreign’, and it maintains
overall authority over any party that has a desire to join the system.
Authentication data for all tenants is retained by the SAC, including
root keys for example.
V. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
In recent years, PUF circuits have produced significant interest
as promising hardware security primitives for low overhead security
applications. A PUF is a hardware entity that is easy to use but hard
to anticipate the behavior.
The design is practically not feasible to clone, even with the
knowledge of the exact design and manufacturing process involved
in its production. Due to this feature, PUFs have been a secure cryp-
tographic substitute for traditional methods of random key generation
and secure key storage.
In this work we use the XOR Arbiter PUF (XOR-APUF) which are
popularly used for authentication and are efficiently implementable
on FPGAs, making them an ideal choice for FPGA based security
applications [55], [56]. APUF is formed by connecting an arbiter to
a pair of parallel paths formed by the switches according to the state
of challenge bits (see figure). This PUF consist of ‘n’ bit challenges
and a single bit response. A standalone APUF is prone to modeling
attacks based on machine learning [57].
As a security measure, we use an XOR- Arbiter PUF (see figure),
with a composition of 10 or more APUFs instances XOR-ed to
generate the response. This composition is proved to be resilient from
machine learning attacks [58].
VI. MULTI-PARTY AUTHENTICATION USING PUF
An FPGA (F) is configured with ‘N’ XOR-PUFs each constituting
of 10 or greater number of Arbiter PUFs. The number ‘N corresponds
to the number of users in the network. Using secure dynamic partial
reconfiguration (DPR), more PUFs can be configured in the FPGA,
to permit any additional (dynamic) user.
We use Xilinx design tools and follow the approach discussed
in [59] for developing partial bitstreams for reconfigurable PUFs.
Reconfiguration is done dynamically over the network. Hardware
updates over the network might bring potential threats in the form of
malicious hardware alterations [60], [61].
We insist the usage of a secure partial reconfiguration over the
network to prevent any malicious alterations of the device using
hardware trojan insertion. Secure IoT hardware updates can also be
done using an authentication protocol enabled by a PUF configured
in the static partition of the device [6].
VII. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
This algorithm provides a secure protocol to authorise a user in
an IoT network without adopting explicit storage of keys at the IoT
nodes (SAC-FPGA or a key vault). This is achieved using a PUF
based protocol.
The method authorises an existing user (Protocol-1), as well as
a new user using the properties of dynamic partial reconfiguration.
A user is declared as genuine if he/she is introduced by an existing
user. A dynamically reconfigurable XOR-arbiter PUF is the security
module behind this algorithm.
The first part of the algorithm defines multiparty authorisation in
a static environment. We define a static environment as a scenario in
which all the requesting IoT nodes (users) are known to the network.
The network contains ‘N’ users (existing) and ‘K’ IoT clouds.
The system contains a file handler, which processes and responds
to requests between the user and a SAC FPGA. SAC-FPGA contains
XOR-APUF configured in its fabric representing every authorised
user in the network. The system consists of an evolvable framework,
to begin with, we consider ‘N’ XOR-APUFs to be configured in the
static part of the FPGA-fabric.
The static part corresponds to the FPGA fabric which is not
expected to bring changes in future after deployment. The number of
APUFs in the XOR-APUF is chosen to be strictly higher than 10 to
avoid any modelling attacks based on machine learning techniques
as described previously.
The FPGA-fabric also contains a dynamic partition, which could
incorporate more PUFs (users) / or modify the existing PUF design
for enhanced security. Addition of a new user using PUF-based
authentication protocol will be discussed in the second phase of the
algorithm.
Every authenticated user holds a mathematical model of the
PUF. A mathematical model of the XOR-APUF with 10 or higher
arbiter stages is configurable only with the knowledge of individual
constituent arbiters. We assume that these modeling parameters are
exchanged through a secure communication channel.
A. Protocol-1
User Ui in the static network requesting an authorisation for a
session on the IoT cloud Cj should follow the following steps. The
User Ui makes a request to the file handler asking an IoT session on
Cloud Cj .
The find handler responds with a set of ‘q’ challenges, each
of size ‘r’. The file handler, for every user, maintains a database
of challenges that have been previously used for PUF based DPR
enabling/disabling, and disregards every old challenge used.
However, for challenge set size of ‘q’ in each authentication
attempt, with each challenge being ‘r’-bit, the probability of repeated
challenges occurring termed as the “Failure Probability” is almost
zero with a typical value of q=1000 and r=64 [6].
On applying the received challenges to the model Mi, the user
produces the responses Rimp. The ‘q’ responses along with the
user ID is concatenated to form a string, which is encoded with a
previously agreed scheme (forms a certificate CAi), and is send to
the file handler.
The file handler sends the received certificate to the SAC-FPGA
for verification. The SAC FPGA decodes the ID and the responses
generated by the mathematical model of PUF Pi, residing with the
user Ui. The SAC FPGA also receives the challenge bits from the
file handler.
On applying the received challenges to the PUF Pi, the SAC FPGA
produces the responses Rifp.
The verification stage finds the match between the two responses.
Fig. 3. Proposed multiparty session authentication framework: The system consists of a session handler, who is responsible for handling the request of
different users. The SAC-FPGA follows a secure authentication protocol to enable access to the various clouds. The FPGA used permits dynamic alteration of
users in the network using dynamic partial reconfiguration. A PUF security primitive implemented on the FPGA is the key element of the secure multiparty
authentication protocol.
Fig. 4. Arbiter PUF: With n-bit challenge and a single bit response. An arbiter
PUF compares two paths with an identical delay in design, where a random
process variation determines which path is faster. Based on the fastest path,
the arbiter outputs a 1-bit digital response.
Fig. 5. XOR Arbiter PUF with k constituent PUFs: Arbiter PUFs are
duplicated k-times to form an XOR Arbiter PUF. All the constituent arbiter
PUFs are given the same challenge bits. The challenge bits select a unique
delay path in determining the outcome of the arbiter. The multiple responses
produced are then XOR-ed to generate a 1-bit digital response.
B. Protocol-2
The second part of the algorithm describes an evolving IoT
network. This protocol is to enable a new user to access an IoT
node after successful introduction by an existing user. A user UB,
Fig. 6. FPGA fabric configured with PUFs: The FPGA fabric is divided into
two regions- the static partition and the dynamic partition. The static partition
consists of PUFs which are configured before deployment and with a fixed
and unalterable design. New PUFs can be added to the dynamic partition as
they evolve with time using dynamic partial reconfiguration feature of the
FPGA. This evolution aids in incorporating dynamic users into the network
by following a trusted multiparty authentication protocol.
Algorithm 1 User is a member of the cloud to be accessed
Objective:
(a) The session Authority Cloud is an FPGA which verifies
the identity of user (UA) who is requesting access.
(b) The FPGA provides session key for the genuine set of
users (U i).
Prerequisites
1) An n-bit input, 1-bit output XOR PUF P 1 is reconfigured
in the static partition of the SAC−FPGA. There exists
a PUF for every authenticated user. PUF P 1 represents
the identity of the user.
2) Each user also has an identity number, ID.
3) A mathematical model M i of P i resides with each User.
4) F and user U i have agreed on a fixed encoding scheme
E(.) and a decoding scheme D(.), such that for any
binary string x,E(.) and D(.) are injective, X = E(x)
and D(X) = x.
Output A value in variable Flag to show that the session is
granted (Flag = 1) or denied (Flag = 0).
Steps
1: U i to File handler F : request Access to IoT cloud Cj
2: F to U i : Request for the identity number ID of the
user and responds to a set of challenges CHp. F sends q
challenge bits each of length n to U i.
3: Ui calculates the following: Rimp = Mi(CHp), p = 1q,
Rim = (Rim1, Rim2, Rim3, Rimq), CAi=E(IDi, Rim)
4: U i to F : U i sends the certificate CAi to F
5: F generates a session ID for the IoT cloud access.
6: F to SAC−FPGA: F sends the set of challenges CHp
and CAi to the SAC − FPGA
7: SAC − FPGA calculates the following
a (ID,Rim) = D(CAi)
b Rifp = Pi(CHp), p = 1q
c Ni = (1−
∑q
(p=1)
(Rimp
⊕
Rifp
q ) If Ni ≥ 0.99, SAC−
FPGA declares U i as an authenticated user.
8: SAC to IoT cloud. Flag indicating U i is authenticated
or not. Sends the SessionID and UserID to to the IoT
Cloud C j if authenticated.
9: Cloud C j approves the decision to grand session for
authenticated user U i. Flag = 1 and exit.
requests an existing user, UA for an introduction to access a cloud,
Ci. The user UB is known to UA as a trusted entity. The user
UA requests that the file handler introduces the new user. The file
handler responds with a set of challenge bits. The user UA applies
the challenge bits to its model and forms a certificate CA, which is
given to the user UB. User UB sends the certificate received from
UA, with its ID number to the file handler. The file handler verifies
if user A is genuine by comparing the responses of the PUF model
and the physical PUF. If UA is successfully authenticated, the FPGA
declares UB to be trustworthy.
Algorithm 2 User is not a member of the cloud to be accessed
Objective:
(a) The Session Authority Cloud is an FPGA which verifies
the identity of user (UB) who is requesting access.
(b) The FPGA provides session key for the genuine set of
new users (Ui).
Prerequisites
1) SAC FPGA has built-in controllers to facilitate secure
dynamic partial reconfiguration.
2) FPGA fabric is divided into two parts, a) static fabric
and b) dynamic fabric. Static fabric consists of PUF
configurations which existed before deployment. They
might be assigned to some set of genuine users in
the beginning. The dynamic fabric is dedicated to con-
figure additional security primitives (mostly PUFs) for
any genuine dynamic user using secure dynamic partial
reconfiguration.
Output A value in variable Flag to show that a session is
granted (Flag = 1) or denied (Flag = 0).
Steps
1: UB requesting introduction to UA to access the cloud C j
2: UA to File handler F : request introduction of UB to cloud
C j
3: F to UA: Request for keys for authentication by sending a
set of challenges CHp. There are ‘q’ challenge bits each
of length ‘n’.
4: UA calculates the following:
a RAmp = MA(CHp), p = 1q
b RAm = (RAm1, RAm2, RAm3, RAmq)
c CAA = E(IDA,RAm)
5: UA to UB UA sends the certificate CAA to UB
6: UB to F: E(IDB,IDA,CAA)
7: F to SAC-FPGA: F new user request IR, set of challenges
CHp and CAA to the SAC-FPGA
8: SAC-FPGA calculates the following
a RAm = D.(CAA)
b RAfp = PA(CHp), p = 1q
c NA = (1−
∑q
(p=1)
(RAmp
⊕
RAfp
q ), If NA ≥ 0.99, SAC-
FPGA declares UA as an authenticated introducer and
UB as a genuine user.
9: SAC FPGA configures new PUFs PB using secure dy-
namic partial reconfiguration in the dynamic part of the
FPGA.
10: SAC-FPGA to UB : sends PUF modelling parameters ‘m’
through secure channel
11: UB constructs the mathematical model MB of the PUF
PB from ‘m’
12: Now UB is same as any other user. Flag = 1 and exit
and follow protocol-1.
This initiates a dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) process,
which adds configures a new PUF in the dynamic part of the FPGA
fabric. We assume that a secure DPR process is followed.
The FPGA sends the modeling parameters to UB, through a secure
channel, enabling the mathematical modelling of the PUF. Now user
UB is same as any other existing user, and has to follow protocol 1
to gain access to the IoT cloud.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Security has always been a concern for companies targeting the
IoT and its many applications, as well as the developers who need the
resources to help ensure they can deliver products that will meet their
customers’ requirements. With the use of cryptography in embedded
devices increasing, semiconductor manufacturers are seeing improved
demand with innovative solutions aimed at ensuring that IoT meets
and probably exceeds their expectations.
This article has considered problems associated with reliable,
timely and secure data transfer mechanisms necessary for shared
business data processing networks.
This multiparty authentication system for dynamic authentication
interactions is effective when members of different security realms
want to access distributed business data micro services [62] through
a trusted principal.
Our proposed mechanism can help cloud session users authenticate
their session membership so as to largely simplify the authentication
processes within multi-party sessions.
While this paper has presented the framework, additional research
and development will develop a set of protocols for multi-party
session management and cross-realm authentication for dynamic au-
thentication interactions, between users and data services in multiple
cloud systems located in different security realms.
The scenario of multiparty authentication across security realms is
not limited to business processes that require access to data services.
Internet of Things (IoT) architectures are a contemporary example of
a need to be able to model, comprehend and deploy authentication
mechanisms that can securely tolerate myriad network nodes that
each provide more cohesive services [2].
We are now progressing the work in two ways.
First, we are formally evaluating the authentication protocols in
order to robustly deploy the framework to an environment that is
composed of a mixed set of discrete devices, enabling the framework
to be tolerant of existing and emerging technologies for cloud
platforms and network infrastructures.
Second, we are now including a variety of devices in addition
to clouds within the simulation, to better understand the effects
upon network performance when greater numbers of low powered
computing and storage wireless nodes are introduced [63].
This replicates the emerging IoT and Industrial IoT scenarios
where extensive integration of Wireless Sensor Networks and edge
computing nodes is commonplace.
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